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Abstract: This paper examines the social impact of healthcare systems upon two key 
stakeholders, patients and healthcare workers. The paper focuses upon „privacy‟, a 
growing concern of organisations involved in the delivery of healthcare services. 
Surprisingly, privacy is typically undervalued in information systems development, 
including healthcare systems.  This paper applies a developmental privacy 
framework to determine a variety of privacy issues pertinent to the use of ICT for 
healthcare applications in the context of the two stakeholders above.  The 
framework identifies privacy issues relevant to the stakeholders and a number of 
relevant themes are discussed.  The paper also notes the absence of human-centred 
investigations of privacy in healthcare informatics.  Finally, the paper demonstrates 
the usefulness of a recently developed privacy framework in assessing the social 
impact of advanced technology systems in the healthcare field. Copyright © 2004 
IFAC 
 




In many societies social welfare systems have 
developed in response to historical social stability 
problems.  In most western economies access to 
effective healthcare services is considered to be a 
major aspect of social welfare and, in Europe, 
consumes a large proportion of government budgets.  
It is therefore evident that key technologies 
associated with the delivery of these systems will 
have a significant impact upon these societies.  
In recent years advanced information technologies 
originally developed for the manufacturing industry, 
such as enterprise resource planning systems (ERP), 
have begun to be installed as healthcare management 
systems.  In this context, these and similar systems 
gather and process enormous amounts of very 
sensitive data.  Indeed, these systems have received 
much attention for the problems they have raised in 
the delivery of healthcare, sometimes leading to 
fatalities (e.g. Burke and Abramovitz, 2000).  This 
has raised concerns about emerging systemic 
problems within health care associated with patient-
centredness. 
Part of the problem is that these developments have 
progressed with little in the way of a critical debate 
within the engineering community as to how these 
systems impact upon the privacy of individuals. In 
the context of patient information, this is due, in part, 
to a lack of any coherent framework by which 
privacy issues can be debated in the context of 
advanced technologies.  
This paper applies a recently developed and 
published preliminary privacy framework to health 
informatics.  In doing this it attempts to show how 
advanced technologies impact privacy issues in the 
social context. This, in turn, has implications for the 
stability of social systems which are engaged by such 
systems. Many of the new technologies, such as ERP, 
are very ubiquitous, integrating entire national health 
systems networks. Consequently, these systems 
impact significantly upon large sections of society 
and merit deep consideration by researchers 
concerned with social stability and technology. 
2. HEALTHCARE, ICT AND PRIVACY 
ICT is being increasingly used in medical 
applications to aid the delivery, efficiency and 
effectiveness of healthcare (Haux, et al., 2002).  
However, the use of ICT in healthcare applications 
raises a number of ethical concerns, and privacy is 
frequently provided as an example in the medical 
literature.  Privacy is therefore highlighted as an 
important and ethically charged issue, but it is 
frequently undervalued in the ISD and healthcare 
informatics literature.  Palen and Dourish (2003) note 
that many social and design studies of technology 
conflate the functions of privacy and subsequently 
fail to provide appropriate analysis.  This paper 
attempts to help redress this situation and performs a 
critical analysis of healthcare informatics from a 
human (or patient) centred privacy perspective.   
Patient-centredness involves a complete 
reorganisation of healthcare delivery whereby the 
individual patients‟ problems and needs determine 
their treatment trajectory (Berg, 2002).  However, the 
term “patient-centred” has become a buzzword and is 
losing meaning.  For example, Berg (2002, p.34) 
notes, “We preach much more patient-centredness 
than we practice.”  Healthcare informatics can only 
pertain to be patient centred if their use is primarily 
for the welfare of the patient, not the healthcare 
organisation.  Human-centred design (HCD) is a field 
of information systems development that places 
people at the forefront of the development of an 
information system.  In HCD, the needs of people are 
considered first, then the needs of organisations, and 
finally the technology required is taken into account 
(cf. Brandt and Cernetic, 1998).  By applying this 
fundamental tenet of HCD to patient-centred systems 
design, the patient (human) should be considered 
first, then the healthcare organisation (doctors, 
hospitals, administration, etc.) and, finally, the 
technology itself.  In principle, a healthcare system 
cannot be patient-centred if it is not human-centred. 
Standard development methodologies do not consider 
privacy as an important human-centric issue (cf. 
Carew and Stapleton, 2004).  Healthcare informatics 
also seems to have underestimated the value of 
privacy, treating it largely as equivalent to data 
integrity, security and availability.  Safran (2002) 
expects that in the future privacy issues will 
dominate social discourse regarding healthcare 
informatics, so it is essential that the concept be 
considered more completely.   
3. A PRIVACY FRAMEWORK FOR 
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS 
Privacy is commonly seen as a boundary control 
process whereby individuals control how much or 
little contact they have with others at a given time in 
a given situation.  It can be achieved in a variety of 
ways, and is very much an individual experience with 
different individuals having different privacy needs.  
An optimum level of privacy is generally required by 
an individual to avoid undesirable behaviour or state 
of mind.  In short, privacy is an important human-
centred value worthy of consideration in the design 
of any socio-technical system.  This paper employs 
the developmental privacy framework presented in 
Carew and Stapleton (2004) to identify some privacy 
issues and problems inherent in healthcare 
informatics.  As the framework incorporates the 
social and psychological aspects of privacy, the 
human and patient-centred privacy issues are 
addressed in some detail.  Table 1 summarises the 
main dimensions of the privacy framework.  
Table 1. Privacy Framework Factors 
 Dimension/Id Factor Class 
Physical   
     P1 Environment  T 
     P2 Territoriality (Property)  T 
     P3 Territoriality (Body)   T 
     P4 Solitude (Physical)  T 
     P5 Repose   T 
     P6 Physical Access   C 
     P7 Sensory and Comms Channels C 
     P8 Violator (Relationship) C 
Social   
     S1 Intimacy (External)  T 
     S2 Intimacy (Internal)  T 
     S3 Territoriality (Status)   T 
     S4 Solitude (Social)  T 
     S5 Anonymity   T 
     S6 Autonomy T 
     S7 Interactions and Comms  C 
     S8 Units  C 
     S9 Formality   C 




     Y1 Self-Identity F 
     Y2 Personal Growth F 
     Y3 Autonomy F 
     Y4 Contemplation F 
     Y5 Self-Protection F 
     Y6 Confiding F 
     Y7 Emotional Release F 
     Y8 Rejuvenation F 
     Y9 Creativity F 
Informational   
     I1 Territoriality (Knowledge)   T 
     I2 Reserve   T 
     I3 Release of Personal Info C 
     I4 Distribution of Personal Info C 
     I5 Use of Personal Info   C 
Global   
     G1 Control C 
     G2 Personal Chars and Circumstance C 
     G3 Organisational C 
     G4 Cultural C 
     G5 Societal C 
 
The framework considers privacy in terms of four 
main dimensions: physical, social, psychological and 
informational.  The physical dimension refers to the 
environment (e.g. office, home, hospital, etc.) where 
an individual may desire physical solitude.  Social 
privacy refers to the freedom individuals have to 
withdraw from, or enter into, interactions with others.  
Psychological privacy is closely related to the social 
dimension, but refers only to the individual psyche.  
Finally, informational privacy refers to an 
individual‟s ability to control personal information.  
Many factors related to privacy can be found in the 
literature and the framework classifies these factors 
into the four dimensions as appropriate.  Each factor 
is classified as being a privacy: type (T), function (F) 
or a contributing factor (C).  A type is simply a type 
or state of privacy desired; a function refers to why 
privacy is sought; and a contributing factor has some 
influence on the ability to achieve privacy.  Some 
contributing factors have been identified as (mainly) 
local to one of the four dimensions whereas others 
have significance across all dimensions. Table 1 
provides a list of the privacy factors along with their 
classifications.  
The framework is intended to help identify privacy 
issues pertaining to the development of an 
information system.  For each factor in the 
framework the main stakeholders‟ privacy should be 
questioned in terms of whether the implementation of 
an information system will affect the factor (i.e. help 
or hinder an individual‟s ability to maintain privacy).  
Those factors identified as potential risks can 
subsequently be addressed.  The suitability of this 
approach is echoed by Hong et al. (2004), who 
propose the use of privacy risk models.  These risk 
models use a (non-prescriptive) list of privacy related 
questions to identify privacy risks, which are then 
assessed in terms of a cost-benefit analysis to 
ascertain and manage those risks which are 
potentially most damaging.  The patient and the 
healthcare worker (e.g. doctor) are the two main 
stakeholders with privacy interests related to the use 
of technology for healthcare.  These stakeholders are 
considered in the following sections. 
4. STAKEHOLDER 1: THE PATIENT 
For patients the main privacy issues are the change of 
environment, the changing relationship with the 
clinician, and the personal information that is 
collected.  The specific needs and concerns of 
patients are very individual but should be 
accommodated where at all possible.  Table 2 shows 
the privacy analysis for patients using the framework 
(columns 4 to 4.4).  The analysis considers the 
patient in general (column 4) and also identifies some 
important themes for the patient (columns 4.1 to 4.4).  
Note that the header for each column identifies the 
relevant paper section, where the main findings are 
discussed.   
4.1. Patient Safety 
Safety benefits offered by ICT in healthcare include: 
ensuring that correct patient data is recorded, 
ensuring that appropriate treatment is provided, 
improved structure and legibility of patient notes, 
decision support, auditing, and controlled access.  
Superficially, patient safety would seem to mean that 
an individual is physically safe while a patient.  
However, patient safety can be considered well 
beyond such a definition.  Harm can befall an 
individual (or their families) as a side effect of 
healthcare long after the process.  Also, harm can be 
non-physical (e.g. social or psychological).  Brennan 
and Safran (2004, p.548) note, with disapproval, that 
“the present patient safety initiative focuses on a care 
horizon that extends only so far as the professionals 
and heath care institutions deem necessary, not to the 
extent that the patient perceives as relevant.  That is, 
the scope of patient safety rules falls within the scope 
of the clinical care encounter as determined by 
professionals.”  An alternative definition of patient 
safety would be: an individual suffers no harm 
(physical or otherwise) as a side effect of undergoing 
healthcare at any time during or after it has been 
completed.  Interestingly it is the use of ICT in 
healthcare, frequently touted as a safety tool, which 
has allowed for potential patient harm during and 
after the healthcare process. 
Table 2. Results of Privacy Analysis 
Fac 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 
P1 X X    X X X   
P2      X X    
P3 X  X  X  X X   
P4 X     X  X  X 
P5     X X     
P6 X X X   X  X  X 
P7 X X    X  X   
P8 X  X X X X  X   
S1 X X         
S2 X  X X  X  X X X 
S3  X   X X X    
S4 X     X  X X X 
S5 X X   X X     
S6 X  X   X X   X 
S7 X  X   X  X X X 
S8      X X  X X 
S9 X     X  X X  
S10 X   X X      
Y1   X     X X X 
Y2   X   X   X X 
Y3 X  X   X    X 
Y4   X   X   X  
Y4 X X X  X X     
Y6 X X X X  X  X X  
Y7 X X X X    X X  
Y8   X        
Y9   X   X    X 
I1 X  X   X X   X 
I2 X  X X X X     
I3 X X X  X     X 
I4 X X X X X X X   X 
I5 X X X X X     X 
G1 X X X  X X X  X X 
G2 X  X  X   X   
G3 X X  X  X X  X X 
G4 X X         
G5 X X   X      
 
The danger to patients comes largely from the 
electronic storing and processing of their data. This 
data can be accessed by unauthorised individuals 
(e.g. hackers) and subsequently viewed and changed.  
Changing record details may result in potentially 
dangerous treatment being provided, resulting in 
physical harm.  As the healthcare systems store a 
large quantity of potentially sensitive personal 
medical information, a given individual may suffer 
considerable social harm if third parties obtained 
certain information.  Physical harm may result if the 
information infers an individual deviates from 
expected norms (of society or other groups).  Even if 
full information on an individual is unavailable, 
inferences can be made.  For example, being on 
certain medication can indicate that an individual has 
a certain illness (e.g. a person on zidovudine will 
typically be HIV positive (Slack, 2001, p.155)).   
Psychological harm is as real as physical harm, and 
people can suffer psychological harm due to the 
healthcare process.  For healthcare informatics, if 
sensitive information on a given individual were 
obtained by a third party and subsequently affected a 
person‟s life (e.g. social standing, ability to work, 
etc.) then psychological harm (e.g. stress, depression) 
could result.  Thus, any illegitimate use of 
information on people can result in people 
themselves (physical, psychological) or their lives 
(social) being affected. 
 
4.2. Patient Empowerment 
Patient empowerment involves informed and 
knowledgeable patients taking more responsibility 
for their own healthcare (Grimson and Grimson, 
2002).  The Internet is pivotal here, with many 
patients seeking out their own healthcare information 
(Safran, 2002; Fieschi, 2002).  The traditional 
healthcare model dominated by physicians where 
patients are simply receivers of health services 
provided by public institutions is giving way to a new 
model of the self-determining patient/citizen 
(Stroetmann, et al., 2003).  Medical decisions are 
becoming increasingly collective, involving the 
patient and an array of healthcare professionals 
(Fieschi, 2002).    Gell (2002, p.71) states “it should 
be a major goal for the next years to assist patients to 
retain and exercise as much autonomy as possible in 
their role as patients.”  To act autonomously, patients 
need a high level of access to and control over 
healthcare information stored about them so to 
control their privacy and make informed decisions. 
While patients in principle should be allowed full 
access to their own records there is a considerable 
risk of misinterpretation.  Therefore, although 
patients would typically be allowed by law to access 
all of their EHR (electronic health record) data most 
patients should only be allowed access to data they 
can easily interpret and understand (Stroetmann, et 
al., 2003). Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986, p.200) also 
express concern about patients taking decisions 
without full information, information that only a 
doctor‟s years of experience can provide, information 
that a doctor cannot covey to a layperson.  Patients 
will, therefore, still need to trust doctors regarding 
appropriate treatment in many situations.   
4.3. Confiding 
The opportunity to confide is one major function of 
privacy (Pedersen, 1997).  Reducing the opportunity 
for one-on-one contact between patient and physician 
can affect the trust relationship, and this could make 
confiding more difficult.  Whether patients could 
confide in a clinician via a tele-care service would 
likely depend on the individual‟s acceptance of and 
comfort with such systems, whether they already 
knew and trusted the clinician, and the nature of the 
information involved.   
4.4. Third Party Use of Patient Data 
While the primary purpose of documenting care 
given to a patient is for the continuity of that care, 
such information is being increasingly used for other 
purposes such as decision support, quality control, 
cost control and research (van der Lei, 2002).   
Access to patient data by third parties is one of the 
main concerns surrounding the privacy of patient 
data.  Clinicians must have access to a substantial 
amount of information on a patient to be able to 
provide safe and effective healthcare.  Their need for 
substantial access (if not full access) certainly is 
legitimate.  However, other parties also access patient 
data but with different agendas.  Slack (2001) notes 
that there are three classes of individuals who access 
patient data (1) those who have no legitimate reason 
whatsoever, (2) those who need part of the patient 
data to perform their jobs and (3) those who need all 
the patient data for healthcare purposes.  Category 2 
is where a number of serious privacy problems lie.  
Some third parties demand patient information 
beyond that actually required for their purposes.  
Insurance companies, for example, frequently require 
full details of patients, tests performed, results, and 
medical histories.  This is clearly superfluous 
information as all an insurance company should need 
is some mechanism to confirm that a patient 
underwent treatment covered by their insurance plan, 
and an indication of the cost involved (cf. Slack, 
2001).  Insurance companies having details beyond 
this is unethical and a major privacy concern.  The 
most obvious danger in insurers obtaining access to 
patient data is that high-risk cases can be identified 
and eliminated (i.e. refused insurance).  Third parties 
may have a legitimate need for some patient 
information but, again, this should be limited on a 
strictly need to know basis (e.g. financial department, 
researchers, etc.).  Government agencies do have a 
legitimate need for access to certain data regarding 
its citizens if a greater common good is at stake (e.g. 
to fight terrorism).  However, governments should 
not be allowed unrestricted access on such a blanket 
basis.  Total surveillance by governments is 
frequently discussed in literature and this possibility 
is being increasingly enabled by technology (cf. 
Parker, 2000).  Also, there is widespread distrust as 
regards to government agencies respecting the 
confidentiality of data on citizens (Gell, 2002).   
Overall, the use of patient information by third 
parties is potentially one of the most privacy-laden 
topics in healthcare informatics.  Again, patients 
should remain in control of their own information 
where possible.   
5. STAKEHOLDER 2: THE HEALTHCARE 
WORKER 
The main privacy issues concerning the healthcare 
worker are the changing physical working 
environment (issues of territory), the changing social 
space (with patients and colleagues), and the amount 
of autonomy and control enjoyed.  Table 2 presents 
the privacy analysis for the healthcare worker 
(column 5), again identifying some relevant themes 
(columns 5.1 to 5.4). 
5.1. Territoriality 
For the healthcare worker, ICT potentially impacts 
on the property, status and knowledge territories.  
Property can refer to practically any physical 
construct and any change to a property perceived to 
be the healthcare worker‟s domain could be deemed 
intrusive.  Using ICT in a clinical setting invariably 
involves changing work practices and procedures, 
and such changes frequently exclude the healthcare 
worker from the decision making process (Slack, 
2001; van der Lei, 2002).  Status is an important 
issue as it addresses issues of power and authority in 
the healthcare organisation.  Technology is not power 
neutral and its use can sway power from one set of 
stakeholders to another (cf. Markus, 1983).  For 
example, technology allows administrators to control 
the lives of healthcare workers, trace their actions, 
ensure they follow only standard procedures, and 
ensure they are working efficiently.  Healthcare 
workers, such as doctors, consequently lose much of 
their autonomy.  In terms of knowledge, 
standardising the recording of data and treatment 
using ICT restricts the healthcare worker‟s ability to 
use other experiential knowledge in treatment, 
rendering such knowledge less valuable.  Denying 
clinicians the opportunity to use their personal 
knowledge is potentially intrusive.  The fact that 
healthcare workers frequently have little say in the 
development of healthcare systems is also 
problematic, as it ignores the healthcare workers 
specialised knowledge and expertise.  Token 
healthcare workers may be superficially involved but 
they frequently have little influence over how the 
system is ultimately developed (Slack, 2001).  Thus, 
the politics under which healthcare workers find 
themselves should be considered when developing a 
new system (Berg, 2002).  Low ranking professionals 
(e.g. nurses) frequently find themselves buying into 
such systems due to promises of empowerment only 
to find that managers are ultimately more empowered 
by the system (Berg, 2002).  People are territorial as 
regards status, and any mishandling (e.g. reducing 
relative status) will create problems. 
5.2. Sentience and Embodiment 
The disembodiment of the patient-doctor contact due 
to using ICT in healthcare is a major concern.  Using 
tele-care services to deliver healthcare remotely or 
simply using EHR information to make diagnoses 
instead of physically visiting patients contribute to 
such disembodiment.  Dreyfus (2001) speaks 
critically of the lack of embodiment due to tele-
presence.  He notes that “telepresence can never give 
us a sense of the reality of far-away things, nor can it 
convey a sense of trust of distant human beings.” 
(p.98).  We can never truly get a grip on the reality, 
as the true context cannot be felt artificially from a 
distance.  Dreyfus suggests that when we are no 
longer embodied the lack of vulnerability felt makes 
the whole experience seem unreal.  Healthcare 
professionals cannot fully understand the reality of 
the remote patient due to the lack of context, which 
can only be established by physical embodied 
presence.  They may miss implicit signs, which are 
only available by being physically present with the 
patient.  Dreyfus states that “the body‟s ability to 
zero in on what is significant, and then preserve that 
understanding in our background awareness, enables 
us to perceive more and more refined situations more 
and more skilfully; its sensitivity to mood opens up 
our shared social situation and makes people and 
things matter to us...” (p.72).  This quote strikes 
noticeable resonance with healthcare, which should 
be delivered skilfully and in a caring fashion.  
Disembodiment, thus, makes it difficult to ascertain 
mood and makes trust building difficult.  Healthcare 
professionals may feel less vulnerable in treating the 
“unreal” (or hyper-real) patient and may 
unknowingly take additional risks.  Empathy and 
trust between patient and professional will be clearly 
affected. This lack of sentience has been identified as 
a problem in other environments (e.g. industrial).  
Zuboff (1988), for example, noted that some 
industrial workers used implicit, subtle signs and 
signals to make sense of situations on the factory 
floor (e.g. temperature, noises, vibrations, smells, 
etc.).  When automation removed the workers from 
being in bodily presence with the production 
processes, those workers frequently missed the 
sentience – the direct environmental contact through 
their bodily senses.  They felt that their problem 
solving abilities were affected due to this lost 
information.  It is therefore appropriate to imply that 
healthcare professionals employ a similar sentience 
in diagnosis and treatment of patients, which would 
be clearly removed by tele-care systems or relying 
solely on EHRs for patient information. 
5.3. Social Issues 
There is a crucial intimacy among healthcare 
professionals, which facilitates knowledge transfer, 
motivation and support.  Using technology to 
substitute informal contact with colleagues will effect 
intimacy and friendship among healthcare workers 
and could also impact on patient care as informal, 
personal communications are a preferred way to pass 
patient information between clinicians (Brown, et al., 
2004).    Physical social contact is still required 
among healthcare professionals, and this can‟t be 
replaced by ICT based on assumptions of improved 
efficiency.  
5.4. Autonomy 
Autonomy used to be a perk of being a doctor (Slack, 
2001, p.185). However, healthcare informatics is 
being used as a tool to standardise care and to make 
efficient use of healthcare personnel by controlling 
many aspects of their lives.  Thus, doctors no longer 
have control over how they work or how they treat 
their patients.  Managers and administrators can trace 
all of a clinician‟s actions for accountability and 
Tayloresque efficiency purposes.  Many information 
systems have substantial surveillance capabilities 
provided as primary functions, or as a side effect of 
their use.  Using technology to monitor healthcare 
workers clearly affects their autonomy.  Superfluous 
surveillance also suggests a lack of trust of those 
being monitored, and this can negatively affect the 
working relationship (Ariss, 2002).  The need for 
accountability and efficiency is being prioritised over 
the need for flexibility and autonomy on the part of 
the healthcare worker.  This appears to place the 
needs of an organisation before that of humans, 
contrary to the philosophy of human-centred design. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
There are legitimate reasons for recording and 
processing medical information using highly 
integrated, distributed systems. However, it cannot be 
simply treated as another set of data like part 
numbers, the bill of material or supplier orders.  It is 
inherently sensitive information, and should be 
afforded special consideration.  The potential harm 
done to patients or society by unintentional and 
intentional misuse must be considered (Gell, 2002).  
A full risk analysis must be performed to weight 
potential harm against potential benefits.  Hong et al. 
(2004) suggests the use of privacy risk models for 
such purposes.  Although risks of improper access 
and misuse may be small, this is not a sound basis for 
deploying potentially harmful technology (Gell, 
2002).  For healthcare systems to become truly 
patient-centred they will have to make the 
consideration of human factors the top priority and 
put the care process ahead of peripheral and 
administrative functions.  Privacy is an example of an 
important human/patient-centred value to consider in 
this respect, but there appears to be little in the way 
of research that considers privacy from a human-
centred standpoint.   
In summary, this paper notes that privacy is typically 
undervalued in information systems development, 
including healthcare systems.  The developmental 
privacy framework outlined in Carew and Stapleton 
(2004) is applied to determine a variety of privacy 
issues pertinent to the use of ICT for healthcare 
applications.  The framework identifies privacy 
issues relevant to the two main stakeholders (the 
patient and the healthcare worker) and a number of 
relevant themes are discussed.  Finally, the paper 
notes the absence of human-centred investigations of 
privacy in healthcare informatics.  Ongoing research 
will seek to redress this issue. Ultimately, the 
dynamics of social systems will be severely impacted 
by these kinds of systems. They consequently require 
more attention by engineers and technologists in 
order to understand the impact our profession is 
having upon our society at large. 
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